NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES OF AMERICAN PRISONERS & MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
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VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR MISSING AMERICANS


VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR MISSING AMERICANS
Sept. 5, 2023


Family members, veteran organizations and other POW/MIA supporters throughout the country consistently opposed
steps to improve economic and political relations with Vietnam until their leaders decided to cooperate fully in
accounting for America’s POW/MIAs. The League supported a Reagan-developed policy of reciprocity – steps by the
US to respond to efforts by Vietnam to locate and return remains and provide issue-related archival documents.
During subsequent stages of the normalization process, important leverage was lost without commensurate results;
however, there has since been much greater responsiveness by Vietnam.

One way of examining Vietnam’s ability to respond more fully is to look at what US intelligence and other data
confirmed at the end of the war. At that time, 196 missing Americans were last known alive in captivity or reliably
reported alive in close proximity to capture. Vietnam knows that these high priority cases are directly related to the live
prisoner issue and has improved responsiveness but, thus far, has accounted for fewer than expected of these
Americans by returning identifiable remains or archival evidence as to why such is not possible. In that regard,
archival documentation is as yet incomplete. In all but very few of these cases, joint field operations have reportedly
been sufficient to confirm death. Logically, if deceased, remains of these Americans should be recoverable; they were
in captivity or on the ground in proximity to Vietnamese forces (other than those who died in captivity in South
Vietnam). Recent unilateral efforts by Vietnam to conduct recoveries and provide working level archival research and
records are encouraging and most welcome, as is the increased number of partnership agreements being reached.
On unilateral SRV provision of Archives, US wartime and post-war reporting on specific cases, captured SRV
documents on the handling of US prisoners and casualties, and wartime debriefs of communist captives, reinforced by
US-monitored directives and other reporting, form a clear picture of a comprehensive Vietnamese system for collection
of information and remains, dating back to the French-Indochina War. Vietnam’s leaders placed great value on
recovery and/or recording of burial locations of US remains. In wartime, if jeopardized by imminent discovery or
recovery by US forces, burial to hide remains was immediate; remains were later disinterred, photographed, when
possible, reburied or, when feasible, transferred to Hanoi. Evidence of this complex process was confirmed by US
intelligence.

Community-wide intelligence assessments served as the basis for long-standing US estimates that Vietnam could
account for hundreds of Americans by unilaterally locating and returning remains. In 1986-87, the entire intelligence
community concluded that Vietnam could unilaterally account for a significant number of US remains. The evidence
was subsequently evaluated to establish the most realistic targets for Vietnam’s government to meet. A thorough
assessment was requested of DoD to weigh cooperation to date against earlier evidence-based expectations and
determine realistic goals. Results were expected early in 2022 but, on September 15, 2022, the League was informed
that a two-page assessment was published, but viewed by DPAA as “useless.” Since that time, and despite several
compelling requests sent to senior US officials, the DPAA Director has declined to request or conduct the intelligence
assessment.

In his most recent refusal letter, DPAA Director Kelly McKeague stated, “an intelligence assessment may have been
helpful in the past [but] it is anachronistic today given DoD’s increasingly solid relationship with the VNOSMP, and as
illustrated in assistance the government and people in Vietnam invariably provide to our accounting effort.” 1 The
VNOSMP, or Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons, just celebrated its 50 th anniversary at a highly visible
ceremony in Hanoi, attended by the DPAA Director. Since US-SRV cooperation began in the mid-1980s, their
interagency personnel comprising the VNOSMP have managed incoming funds and the level of SRV cooperation
directed by the Politburo.

With the DPAA Director’s third refusal, there was no longer any option for the League but to undertake the assessment
necessary to determine realistic expectations, central to forming operational plans to accomplish and establish core
objectives. League Executive Director Dr. Jay Veith is now focused on finalizing the needed assessment on SRV
archives that have been and could yet be provided unilaterally if Hanoi decides it is in their interest. Due to pressing
international policy and political concerns, now is a critical time to consider increasing bilateral and multilateral
1 Letter from Kelly McKeague, Director, DPAA, to Ann Mills-Griffiths, League Chair of the Board, April 12, 2023. relations across the board. With Vietnam, that means moving from a comprehensive partnership to a comprehensive strategic one, a step the League has worked to support, so NOW IS THE TIME.

On unilateral SRV provision of remains, sources such as the mortician in 1979, substantiated in the 1980s by
others, highlighted remains collection and storage as key aspects of Vietnam’s policy leading to discussions with the
US. After arduous and sustained negotiations, the US and Vietnam reached agreement to return remains of
Americans that had been stored for years. Thus far, the number repatriated has not met evidence-based US
expectations.

Forensic evidence serves as another basis for establishing expectations. Per the DPAA Lab, scientific evidence of
above or below ground storage, or both, exists on fewer than 200 of the 730 identified remains returned from Vietnam
since the end of the war. The count, confirmed by DPAA forensic scientists, is far below US expectations, based on
reliable intelligence indicating that many more were recovered and stored by the Vietnamese government and could be
repatriated, if authorized by Vietnam’s leadership.

During a September 1982 ABC “Nightline” program, the late Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Co Thach
denied that Vietnam was holding any US remains. In 1983, Vietnam returned eight remains with clear evidence of
storage. Vietnam later admitted storage of remains. In 1985, following up an initiative through a regional government,
a US National Security Council (NSC) official met privately with an SRV Politburo member during an NSC-led US
delegation to Hanoi in which the League participated. The carefully drawn plan was for negotiations on live prisoners
and remains, but the minister indicated live prisoners were not on the table for discussion. Rather, as discussed with a
third party, the subject was a large number of remains.

Negotiations in 1985 for a two-year plan brought the largest number of remains obtained to that point; nearly all
showed evidence of long-term storage. Two specific cases were officially presented to officials in Hanoi in 1985-86,
requesting unilateral assistance. Both losses were assessed by US officials as having occurred in Laos, in areas under
Vietnamese control during the war. One was returned unilaterally in 1988, 98% complete and stored above ground
since his 1972 incident along the border between Vietnam and Laos. From 1985 – 1989, 169 remains were
repatriated, most showing clear evidence of long-term storage. In addition to locating remains in highly populated
areas, Vietnam repatriated stored remains from Cambodia and remote locations.

In 1991 and 1993, the SRV provided grave registration lists with names of unaccounted-for Americans. Inclusion of
these names appears to have been an intentional signal, as was filtering through private channels photographs of
deceased Americans, some of whose remains have yet to be returned. SRV leaders directed combat photography;
their soldiers did not own personal cameras, much less carry them. Regardless of mixed or conflicting assessments,
these and other actions by SRV officials signaled the US of remains availability. At the time, remains fragments in
Vietnam’s possession were not repatriated, believed not to be identifiable, but US ability to identify very fragmentary
remains has dramatically improved. If not yet fully repatriated, now is the time for all fragmentary, potential US
remains to be returned.

In his March 20,2002, Certification to Congress, President George W. Bush formalized criteria for steps Vietnam
should take unilaterally to be fully responsive on the accounting effort, further defined by Secretaries of State Powell
and Rice three times. On March 7, 2008, the Bush Administration issued its Determination to Congress stating,
“…….we urge Vietnam to work aggressively to improve tangibly its unilateral provision of POW/MIA-related documents
and records, focused initially on archival data pertaining to Americans captured, missing or killed in areas of Laos and
Cambodia under wartime Vietnamese control. Vietnam should also focus greater attention on locating and providing
information on discrepancy cases with priority on those last known alive in captivity or in immediate proximity to
capture, and to locating and repatriating the remains of those who died while in Vietnamese control that have not yet
been returned…”

Vietnam’s cooperation has continued to improve, including provision of some archival documents. There remain
sensitive areas seldom accessible by US officials, but most are no longer off-limits. Importantly, SRV officials are now
unilaterally conducting investigations, locating witnesses and making them available. With the DoD decision due to
COVID restrictions, DPAA canceled all joint field operations for almost two years. In the interim, SRV officials
authorized unilateral recoveries in various areas, a long-sought, welcome development with positive results. CDR
Paul Charvet, USN, MIA in 1967, was unilaterally recovered Aug-Sep 2020 in the Hon Me area off the coast of
northern Vietnam and identified on March 1, 2021. Unilateral recoveries in this area are a long-sought goal and adding
private partnerships would likely help increase results that end the uncertainty of Vietnam War POW/MIA families.
December 12, 2022, pledges by SRV Minister of Public Security To Lam to address increased unilateral steps are
encouraging.

Information obtained from post-war US field operations reveals that central SRV authorities systematically directed the

recovery of American remains. Eyewitnesses reported central-level supervision of remains recoveries of US
personnel. Vietnam’s leaders have repeatedly pledged to renew and increase their own efforts to locate and return
remains and provide relevant documents, and have moved incrementally. Recently, SRV responsiveness has further
increased. Further Increasing military-to-military cooperation and moving toward a comprehensive strategic
partnership means now is the time for Vietnam to accelerate unilateral efforts to close these historic gaps.
vns_ability_to_account_.pdf

​VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR MISSING AMERICANS
​
July 24, 2023
​

​Family members, veteran organizations and other POW/MIA supporters throughout the country consistently opposed
steps to improve economic and political relations with Vietnam until their leaders decided to cooperate fully in
accounting for America’s POW/MIAs. The League supported a Reagan-developed policy of reciprocity – steps by the
US to respond to efforts by Vietnam to locate and return remains and provide issue-related archival documents.
During subsequent stages of the normalization process, important leverage was lost without commensurate results;
however, there has since been much greater responsiveness by Vietnam.

One way of examining Vietnam’s ability to respond more fully is to look at what US intelligence and other data
confirmed at the end of the war. At that time, 196 missing Americans were last known alive in captivity or reliably
reported alive in close proximity to capture. Vietnam knows that these highest priority cases are directly related to the
live prisoner issue and has improved responsiveness but, thus far. has accounted for fewer than expected of these
Americans by returning identifiable remains, or archival evidence as to why such is not possible. In that regard,
archival documentation is as yet incomplete. In all but very few of these cases, joint field investigations have
reportedly been sufficient to confirm death. Logically, if deceased, remains of these Americans should be recoverable;
they were in captivity or on the ground in proximity to Vietnamese forces (other than those who died in captivity in
South Vietnam). Recent unilateral efforts by Vietnam to conduct recoveries and provide working level archival
research and records are encouraging and most welcome, as is the increased number of partnership agreements
being reached.

On unilateral SRV provision of Archives, US wartime and post-war reporting on specific cases, captured SRV
documents on the handling of US prisoners and casualties, and wartime debriefs of communist captives, reinforced by
US-monitored directives and other reporting, form a clear picture of a comprehensive Vietnamese system for collection
of information and remains, dating back to the French-Indochina War. Vietnam’s leaders placed great value on
recovery and/or recording of burial locations of US remains. In wartime, if jeopardized by imminent discovery or
recovery by US forces, burial to hide remains was immediate; remains were later disinterred, photographed, when
possible, then reburied or, when feasible, transferred to Hanoi. Evidence of this complex process was confirmed by
US intelligence.

Community-wide intelligence assessments served as the basis for long-standing US estimates that Vietnam could
account for hundreds of Americans by unilaterally locating and returning remains. In 1986-87, the entire intelligence
community concluded that Vietnam could unilaterally account for a significant number of US remains. The evidence
was subsequently evaluated to establish the most realistic targets for Vietnam’s government to meet. A thorough
assessment was requested of DoD to weigh cooperation to date against earlier evidence-based expectations and
determine realistic goals. Results were expected early in 2022 but, on September 15, 2022, the League was informed
that a two-page assessment was published, but viewed by DPAA as “useless.” Since that time, and despite several
compelling requests sent to senior US officials, the DPAA Director has declined to request or conduct the intelligence
assessment.

In his most recent refusal letter, DPAA Director Kelly McKeague stated, “an intelligence assessment may have been
helpful in the past [but] it is anachronistic today given DoD’s increasingly solid relationship with the VNOSMP, and as
illustrated in assistance the government and people in Vietnam invariably provide to our accounting effort.” 1 The
VNOSMP, or Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons, just celebrated its 50 th anniversary at a highly visible
ceremony in Hanoi, attended by the DPAA Director. Since US-SRV cooperation began in the mid-1980s, their
interagency personnel comprising the VNOSMP have managed incoming funds and directed the level of SRV
cooperation directed by the Politburo.

With the DPAA Director’s third refusal, there was no longer any option for the League but to undertake the assessment
necessary to determine realistic expectations, central to forming operational plans to accomplish and establish core
objectives. League Executive Director Dr. Jay Veith is now focused on finalizing the needed assessment on SRV
archives that have been and could yet be provided unilaterally if Hanoi decides it is in their interest. Due to pressing
1 Letter from Kelly McKeague, Director, DPAA, to Ann Mills-Griffiths, League Chairman of the Board, April 12, 2023.

international policy and political concerns, now is a critical time of increasing bilateral and multilateral relations across
the board. With Vietnam, that means moving from a comprehensive partnership to a strategic one, a step the League
has worked to support, so NOW IS THE TIME.
On unilateral SRV provision of remains, sources such as the mortician in 1979, substantiated in the 1980s by
others, highlighted remains collection and storage as key aspects of Vietnam’s policy leading to discussions with the
US. After arduous and sustained negotiations, the US and Vietnam reached agreement to return remains of
Americans that had been stored for years. Thus far, the number repatriated has not met evidence-based US
expectations.

Forensic evidence serves as another basis for establishing expectations. Per the DPAA Lab, scientific evidence of
above or below ground storage, or both, exists on less than 200 of the 729 identified remains returned from Vietnam
since the end of the war. The count, confirmed by DPAA forensic scientists, is far below US expectations, based on
reliable intelligence indicating that many more were recovered and stored by the Vietnamese government and could be
repatriated, if authorized by Vietnam’s leadership.

During a September 1982 ABC “Nightline” program, the late Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Co Thach
denied that Vietnam was holding any US remains. In 1983, Vietnam returned eight remains with clear evidence of
storage. Vietnam later admitted storage of remains. In 1985, following up an initiative through a regional government,
a US National Security Council (NSC) official met privately with an SRV Politburo member during an NSC-led US
delegation to Hanoi in which the League participated. The carefully drawn plan was for negotiations on live prisoners
and remains, but the minister indicated live prisoners were not on the table for discussion. Rather, as discussed with a
third party, the subject was a large number of remains.

Negotiations in 1985 for a two-year plan brought the largest number of remains obtained to that point; nearly all
showed evidence of long-term storage. Two specific cases were officially presented to officials in Hanoi in 1985-86,
requesting unilateral assistance. Both losses were assessed by US officials as having occurred in Laos, in areas under
Vietnamese control during the war. One was returned unilaterally in 1988, 98% complete and stored above ground
since his 1972 incident along the border between Vietnam and Laos. From 1985 – 1989, 169 remains were
repatriated, most showing clear evidence of long-term storage. In addition to locating remains in highly populated
areas, Vietnam repatriated stored remains from Cambodia and remote locations.

There is further continuity. In 1991 and 1993, the SRV provided grave registration lists with names of unaccounted-for
Americans. Inclusion of these names appears to have been an intentional signal, as was filtering through private
channels photographs of deceased Americans, some of whose remains have yet to be returned. SRV leaders directed
combat photography; their soldiers did not own personal cameras, much less carry them. Regardless of mixed or
conflicting assessments, these and other actions by SRV officials signaled the US of remains availability. At the time,
remains fragments in Vietnam’s possession were not repatriated, believed not to be identifiable, but US ability to
identify very fragmentary remains has dramatically improved. If not yet fully repatriated, now is the time for all
fragmentary, potential US remains to be returned.

In his March 20,2002, Certification to Congress, President George W. Bush formalized criteria for steps Vietnam
should take unilaterally to be fully responsive on the accounting effort, further defined by Secretaries of State Powell
and Rice three times. On March 7, 2008, the Bush Administration issued its Determination to Congress stating,
“…….we urge Vietnam to work aggressively to improve tangibly its unilateral provision of POW/MIA-related documents
and records, focused initially on archival data pertaining to Americans captured, missing or killed in areas of Laos and
Cambodia under wartime Vietnamese control. Vietnam should also focus greater attention on locating and providing
information on discrepancy cases with priority on those last known alive in captivity or in immediate proximity to
capture, and to locating and repatriating the remains of those who died while in Vietnamese control that have not yet
been returned…”

Vietnam’s cooperation has continued to improve, including provision of some archival documents. There remain
sensitive areas seldom accessible by US officials, but most are no longer off-limits. Importantly, SRV officials are now
unilaterally conducting investigations, locating witnesses and making them available. With the DoD decision due to
COVID restrictions, DPAA canceled all joint field operations for almost two years. In the interim, SRV officials
authorized unilateral recoveries in various areas, a long-sought, welcome development with positive results. CDR
Paul Charvet, USN, MIA in 1967, was unilaterally recovered Aug-Sep 2020 in the Hon Me area off the coast of
northern Vietnam and identified on March 1, 2021. Unilateral recoveries in this area are a long-sought goal and adding
private partnerships would likely help increase results that end the uncertainty of Vietnam War POW/MIA families.
December 12, 2022, pledges by SRV Minister of Public Security To Lam to address increased unilateral steps are
encouraging.

Information obtained from post-war US field operations reveals that central SRV authorities systematically directed the
recovery of American remains. Eyewitnesses reported central-level supervision of remains recoveries of US
personnel. Vietnam’s leaders have repeatedly pledged to renew and increase their own efforts to locate and return
remains and provide relevant documents, and have moved incrementally. Recently, SRV responsiveness has further
increased. Establishing comprehensive bilateral relations, including increased military-to-military cooperation, and
moving toward a strategic partnership means now is the time for Vietnam to accelerate unilateral efforts to close these
historic gaps.

vns_ability_to_account_7-24-23_-_final.pdf

COPYRIGHT © 2023 National League of Families of American Prisoners And Missing In S E Asia​
  • Home
  • Membership
  • WHO WE ARE
    • Mission
    • Leadership
    • You Can Help
  • INFO FOR ALL
    • Status of the Issue
    • Vietnam’s Ability to Account for American’s Missing From the Vietnam War
    • Number of Americans Still Missing and Unaccounted-for by State
    • Annual Meetings >
      • Historical Documents
      • League Awards >
        • Senior Officials who have addressed the Annual Meeting
  • RESOURCES/PROGRAMS
    • POW/MIA FLAG PROTOCOL
    • HISTORY OF POW/MIA BRACELETS
    • HISTORY OF POW/MIA FLAG
    • Missing Man Honors Table History >
      • Missing Man Table and Honors Ceremony
    • USRJC
    • USG >
      • Congressional Resources >
        • Congressional Actions
    • A Teaching Guide
    • Social Media Policies
  • News
    • Identifications
    • Photos
  • Recognition Day
  • Events
  • POW/MIA Products